NYLS Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 2 Spotlight on Student Scholarship

Article 1

January 2020

Restoring Stare Decisis in the Wake of Janus v. AFSCME, Council
31
James Tilghman
New York Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Legal History
Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons

Recommended Citation
James Tilghman, Restoring Stare Decisis in the Wake of Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 64 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 135 (2019-2020).

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion
in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

VOLUME 64 | 2019/20

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 64 | 2019/20
JAMES TILGHMAN

Restoring Stare Decisis in the Wake of
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31
64 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 135 (2019–2020)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: James Tilghman was a Staff Editor of the 2018–2019 New York Law School Law
Review. He received his J.D. from New York Law School in 2019.

135

RESTORING STARE DECISIS IN THE WAKE OF JANUS v. AFSCME, COUNCIL 31
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the 2018 confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the notion that the
Supreme Court enjoys insulation from partisan politics is on the verge of extinction.1
In the eyes of the public, it is certain that the Court will be viewed as a political unit
motivated, at least in part, to further political ends. Now more than ever, the Court
needs a tool that will reestablish the public’s faith that it will exercise independent
judgment in deciding the law. The doctrine of stare decisis serves as the appropriate
agenda-limiting function necessary to curb the—perceived or actual—politicization
of the Court. However, in its current state, the doctrine of stare decisis is too weak to
serve that function.
Restructuring the stare decisis analysis, along with an increased focus on the
reliance interests involved in overturning or upholding precedent, will serve to
strengthen this doctrine and help reestablish the Court’s legitimacy as an apolitical
body. Most importantly, the reconceptualization of stare decisis will help limit the
ability of the Court to overturn precedent as a means to achieve contemporary
political ends. This Note traces the evolution of the stare decisis doctrine, contends
that Justice Samuel Alito’s 2018 majority opinion in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 312
significantly weakened the doctrine, and explores a solution to strengthen it.
The doctrine of stare decisis, while still legitimate, is wielded inconsistently,
relied on at random, and in a constant state of flux.3 Stare decisis plays an important
role in the legal system—it promotes system stability and legitimacy, and strengthens
settled law, such as the prohibition of racial discrimination by the government.4 How
the doctrine is used is relatively clear when deciding cases at one of two extremes.
On one end of the spectrum are “super-precedent”—cases that set forth well-settled
norms and are essentially irreversible, as any change would destabilize the government
and society.5 In super-precedent, stare decisis serves an agenda-limiting function by
removing certain constitutional questions from reconsideration.6 At the other end of
the spectrum are cases in which the Court encounters precedent that is fundamentally
1.

See Zack Beauchamp, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis is Here, Vox (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.
vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/6/17915854/brett-kavanaugh-senate-confirmed-supreme-courtlegitimacy.

2.

138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).

3.

Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411, 414 (2010). Kozel
explains:

Id.

The catalog of factors that inform the stare decisis inquiry is lengthy and uncertain . . . .
The sheer number of these considerations, combined with the fact that the Court often
selects a few items from the catalog without explaining how much work is being done
by each, makes it difficult even to find a starting point for thinking critically about stare
decisis as a judicial doctrine.

4.

See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

5.

See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1204, 1205–10 (2006).

6.

Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 745
(1988).

136

N

VOLUME 64 | 2019/20

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

incompatible with contemporary society.7 Application of stare decisis in these cases
would only perpetuate laws that are irreconcilable with modern times; such precedent
can be overturned without objection.8
Between these two extremes, of course, lie the difficult cases. The question of
when and how to apply stare decisis to these cases remains contested and is rooted in
two competing viewpoints.9 The strict view promotes legitimacy, consistency, and
continuity, and argues that precedent should be granted deference, regardless of the
prior decisions’ reasoning.10 Conversely, the lax view argues that responsiveness to
contemporary issues demands a more forgiving and flexible doctrine of stare decisis.11
Courts look at several factors when conducting a stare decisis analysis to
determine whether precedent should be followed.12 Factors frequently cited as
important include: (1) the precedent’s soundness of reasoning; (2) the workability of
the precedent in contemporary times; (3) legal developments since the precedent
came down that may have “eroded” the decision’s “underpinnings,” and (4) the

7.

See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Note that Plessy was not overruled by a single case.
Rather, in Brown, the Court initially declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional. Brown,
347 U.S. at 495. The Court would go on to extend Brown in a series of cases that declared segregation
unconstitutional in various public settings—essentially eviscerating Plessy in piecemeal fashion. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 795–98 (4th ed. 2013).

8.

See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the Texas statute making it a crime
for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain sexual acts violated the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, expressly overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding statutes that restrict the freedom to marry solely based on racial classifications
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, expressly overruling Pace v. Alabama, 106
U.S. 583 (1883)).

9.

Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v.
Maryland, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 77, 90–91 (2012). Any Supreme Court decision in which there is a
dissenting opinion that involves potentially reversing precedent will inevitably contain a discussion of
stare decisis. For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the majority opinion found
that stare decisis did not serve to uphold the precedent in question. See 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010).
However, in his dissent, Justice Paul Stevens argued that the doctrine of stare decisis should have
applied. Id. at 478–79.

10.

Starger, supra note 9, at 90. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (“[A]
decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was
wrongly decided.”).

11.

Starger, supra note 9, at 91. This view was articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Hertz v. Woodman, 218
U.S. 205, 212 (1910) (“The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of
decision, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within
the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.”).

12.

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2458 (2018) (“An analysis of several important factors
. . . should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past decision[.]”).
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reliance interests13 at stake.14 Undoubtedly, the potential impact on the people and
governmental institutions should be deliberated whenever the Court considers
overruling precedent. Recently, however, when articulating the reason for overturning
precedent, the Court has begun to dismiss reliance interests and instead has focused
on the reasoning of the decision in question.15 This inconsistent—and often
incoherent—approach has drawn criticism as the Court invokes stare decisis at
seemingly random points, strengthening the suspicion that the Court is manipulating
the doctrine as a way to achieve varying political ends.16
This trend continued in 2018 when the Court, in Janus,17 overturned its 1977
decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education18 In Janus, the Court held that
government workers who choose not to join public unions cannot be forced to pay for
collective bargaining.19 In doing so, the Court overturned its decision in Abood that
required nonmembers of a public union to help pay for the union’s collective bargaining
13.

Reliance interests are a form of remedy that intends to “put [the nonbreaching party back] in the position
that would have resulted if the contract had not been made, including out-of-pocket costs.” Reliance
Interests, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Reliance interests are especially important in cases
involving contract and property disputes. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 803, 828 (1991) (finding that
cases involving property and contract disputes, where reliance interests were especially strong, are more
amenable to the doctrine of stare decisis). However, the Court’s decisions often emphasize the reliance
interests involved in regards to the judicial goals of stability and reliability, rather than the contractual
remedy. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56; Starger, supra note 9, at 90. In upholding Roe v. Wade, the
Court explained how women have relied on Roe and modified their behavior on the presumption that
the decision will remain. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56. The Court further stated:
The Roe rule’s limitation on state power could not be repudiated without serious inequity
to people who, for two decades of economic and social developments, have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception
should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. The
Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be
exactly measured, neither can the certain costs of overruling Roe for people who have
ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.

Id. The Court has explained that, generally: “Stare decisis has added force when the legislature, in the
public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm, have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this
instance overruling the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive
legislative response.” Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).
14.

Brandon J. Murrill, Cong. Research Serv., R45319, The Supreme Court’s Overruling of
Constitutional Precedent 12 (2018).

15.

See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.

16.

Derigan Silver & Dan Kozlowski, Preserving the Law’s Coherence: Citizens United v. FEC and Stare
Decisis, 21 Comm. L. & Pol’y 39, 51–52 (2016); see also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(“Rarely if ever has the Court overruled a decision—let alone one of this import—with so little regard
to the usual principles of stare decisis.”).

17.

138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018).

18.

431 U.S. 209 (1977).

19.

Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Labor Unions, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-unions-organized-labor.html.
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to ensure labor peace and prevent “free riders.”20 The Janus Court claimed that its
departure from the Abood precedent was necessary because it was “poorly reasoned,”
led to practical problems, was inconsistent with First Amendment cases, and had been
undermined by recent decisions.21 Notably, the Court dismissed the reliance interests
involved in Janus as insufficient to justify upholding Abood.22 The Court came to its
decision without regard to the practical impact the ruling would have on individuals
and entities that had relied on Abood in organizing their affairs.23 With its focus on
the “poor reasoning” and dismissal of reliance interests, the Court crippled the
doctrine of stare decisis.24 This approach fails to properly moderate ideological swings
and threatens the integrity of the Court as an apolitical body. 25
This Note argues that (1) the Court’s dismissal of the reliance interests significantly
weakened the doctrine of stare decisis and (2) whether a precedent is “poorly reasoned”
should not serve as a factor in a stare decisis analysis, but rather, should serve to
trigger a stare decisis analysis. Part II of this Note explores the evolution of the stare
decisis doctrine and traces the path to its contemporary form. Part III discusses the
problems with the current interpretation of stare decisis, as highlighted in Justice
Alito’s 2018 majority opinion in Janus. Part IV proposes a new stare decisis analysis—
one that, by maintaining a focus on reliance interests, serves to strengthen the
doctrine. Finally, Part V concludes this Note.
II. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE & COMPETING INTEPRETATIONS

A. Tracing the History of Stare Decisis

Up until the early eighteenth century, common-law judges and scholars followed
the declaratory theory of common law.26 This theory rested on the notion that the law
had an “ideal existence” notwithstanding the decision of any one court.27 Thus, any
judicial declaration that seemed inconsistent with the “ideal existence” could be
superseded by a new decision.28 In other words, it was the function of the judge not to

20. Abood, 431 U.S. at 224.
21.

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.

22.

Id.

23.

In Citizens United, Justice Stevens articulates that relitigating the merits of the precedent in question is
simply a tool used by justices to overturn precedent that they do not like. See Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 409–11 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

24.

Michael J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent 18 (2008) [hereinafter The Power of Precedent].

25.

Id.

26. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52

Vand. L. Rev. 647, 659–60 (1999).

27.

Id. at 660.

28. Id.
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make, but rather, to declare law.29 Accordingly, adherence to prior decisions was not
necessary because such decisions were merely evidence of the law, not the law itself. 30
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there was a shift in ideology
that laid the foundation for stare decisis. 31 During this period, Anglo-American
courts came to regard past decisions as more persuasive and became compelled to
articulate some justification for setting aside prior decisions.32 William Blackstone’s
reasoning is reflected in Founding-Era stare decisis jurisprudence, and his general
theory, that precedent has binding properties, 33 was recognized at the time the
Constitution was framed.34 Evidence suggests that the Framers intended to include,
within Article III’s grant of “the judicial Power,”35 the power to create binding law
and precedent.36 While the Court has stated that stare decisis is “not an inexorable
command,”37 courts today still recognize that the doctrine is necessary to preserve
legitimacy and provide stability.38

29. Edward Coke, The Second Part of The Institutes of the Laws of England 51 (1642).
30. Lee, supra note 26, at 660.
31.

Id. at 661.

32.

Id. William Blackstone expressed this idea in the late eighteenth century by stating that “it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; as well as
to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge’s opinion.”
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (1765). However, Blackstone
cautioned that blindly adhering to precedent might not be the best approach “since it sometimes may
happen that the judge may mistake the law.” Id. at 71.

33.

Lee, supra note 26, at 681–84.

34. Richard H. Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 579 (2001) (“Historians

record that the doctrine of precedent either was established or becoming established in state courts by
the time of the Constitutional Convention.”). Alexander Hamilton referenced the role of precedent in
The Federalist No. 78. He stated that, “to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable
that [the courts] should be bound down by strict rules and precedents[.]” The Federalist No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton) [hereinafter Hamilton]. Hamilton took a very narrow approach to stare decisis,
believing that precedent should serve as strict rules that bind and define the duty of the court in every
case. See Lee, supra note 26, at 663. However, The Federalist No. 78 is not a treatise on stare decisis, and
it is unclear whether Hamilton was merely describing a vertical rule of stare decisis requiring lower
courts to follow higher federal court precedent. Id. at 664. Other Founding-Era commenters took a
position similar to Blackstone, writing that stare decisis should be tempered to some degree when there
is a strong reason for doing so. Id. See also Cranch’s Preface, 5 U.S. iii, iv (1804) (“Every case decided is a
check upon the judge. He can not decide a familiar case differently, without strong reasons, which, for
his own justification, he will wish to make public. The avenues to corruption are thus obstructed, and
the sources of litigation closed.”).

35.

U.S. Const. art III, § 1.

36. See Fallon, supra note 34, at 579. While there is no question that decisions of higher courts bind lower

courts in the same jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is not subject to the same limitations because it is the
highest court in the United States. See Hamilton, supra note 34.

37.

See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).

38. See The Power of Precedent, supra note 24, at 18.
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B. Contemporary Interpretations and Competing Ideologies

Most contemporary jurists recognize that the Supreme Court is not bound by—
and thus has the power to overrule—its own precedent.39 Two competing positions
have emerged regarding the degree to which the Court should follow its precedent.40
The strict—or strong—view of stare decisis calls for adhering to precedent absent
some particular justification.41 Conversely, the lax—or weak—view accepts overruling
precedent more easily.42 The lax view was best articulated in 1932 by Justice Louis
Brandeis’ dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil.43 Under Brandeis’ view, the Court may
overrule its own precedent when experience, coupled with the passage of time,
dictates that the “force of better reasoning” must prevail.44 Empirically, Brandeis’
view has prevailed, as the Court has overruled precedent over two hundred times in
its history.45 The strict view of stare decisis was manifested in 1992 when the Court
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey46 declined to overturn its 1973 decision in Roe v.
Wade.47 The Casey plurality viewed overruling as appropriate only in narrow
circumstances, such as when: (1) a rule has become practically unworkable; (2)
developments in the law have left an old rule a remnant of abandoned doctrine, or (3)
facts have changed to a degree that the old rule is simply inapplicable.48 This strict
view directs the Court to follow its precedent regardless of whether it was wrong or
poorly reasoned.49
These two views of stare decisis essentially differ in the deference given to the
underlying reasoning of the precedent in question.50 The lax view justifies overturning
39.

Starger, supra note 9, at 89.

40. Id. at 90–91.
41.

Id. at 90.

42.

Id.

43.

285 U.S. 393, 405–13 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Brandeis stated:
Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal inexorable command. . . .
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is commonly true
even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by
legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier
decisions.

Id. (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 408.
45.

See Table of Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decisions, Constitution Annotated,
https://constitution.congress.gov/conan/appendix/decisions-overruled/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).

46. 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992).
47.

401 U.S. 1113 (1973) (holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy
in its early stages).

48. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55.
49. Starger, supra note 9, at 92.
50. Id.
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poorly reasoned precedent and authorizes more change and f luidity in Supreme
Court jurisprudence.51 The strict view places little emphasis on a precedent’s
reasoning and focuses on the importance of promoting stability and the rule of law.52
Regardless of whether one takes a strict or lax view of stare decisis, there are
sound policy rationales for adherence to Supreme Court precedent, at least to some
extent.53 The doctrine remains functionally desirable because it promotes stability,
protects settled expectations, conserves judicial resources, and adds predictability to
the everyday affairs of citizens.54 Further, stare decisis acts as a bastion of legitimacy
by moderating potential ideological swings and assuring the public that the Court is
an apolitical legal institution.55 Significantly weakening or eliminating the doctrine
undermines the rule of law and “represent[s] an explicit endorsement of the idea that
the Constitution is nothing more than what five Justices say it is.”56
III. THE PROBLEM: CONTINUED WEAKENING OF STARE DECISIS

Over the last decade, two Supreme Court decisions—Citizens United and Janus—
have weakened the doctrine of stare decisis in significant ways.57 In 2010, the Court in
Citizens United 58 overruled two Supreme Court decisions from 1990 and 2003, Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce59 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
respectively.60 The majority reasoned:

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“We recognize that stare decisis embodies an
important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic
need to satisfy reasonable expectations.”).

54. Fallon, supra note 34, at 587–88; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and

Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 67, 70 (1988).

55.

Fallon, supra note 34, at 587–88.

56. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 281, 288 (1990).
57.

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 411 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Stare decisis protects not only personal rights involving property or contract but
also the ability of the elected branches to shape their laws in an effective and coherent fashion. Today’s
decision takes away a power that we have long permitted these branches to exercise.”); Janus v.
AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2497 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). In the Janus dissent,
Justice Elena Kagan states:
But the worse part of today’s opinion is where the majority subverts all known principles
of stare decisis. The majority makes plain, in the first 33 pages of its decision, that it
believes Abood was wrong. But even if that were true (which it is not), it is not enough.
Respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.

Id. (citations omitted).

58. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312.
59.

494 U.S. 652 (1990).

60. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare
decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake,
and of course whether the decision was well reasoned. [The Court has] also
examined whether experience has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.61

In 2018, the majority in Janus eschewed the doctrine of stare decisis by overturning
its 1977 decision in Abood.62 The majority reasoned that Abood was “poorly reasoned,”
led to practical problems, and was inconsistent with other First Amendment cases.63
Most importantly, the Court dismissed the reliance interests as insufficient to justify
upholding the precedent and thus, overruled Abood.64 Like in Citizens United, the
Court in Janus came to the conclusion that the prior decision—Abood—was not wellreasoned and therefore overturned it.65
The majority opinions in Citizens United and Janus erode the doctrine of stare
decisis in two ways. First, by focusing on the merits of the reasoning in the past
Court decisions in question, the Court made it easier to overturn decisions that any
current majority of the Court disfavors. This is dangerous because an application of
stare decisis that results in overturning precedent primarily on the merits of its
reasoning leaves the door open for politically motivated actors to manipulate our law
by placing partisan justices on the Court—causing further politization.66 This is
evidenced from the increased political jockeying involved in Supreme Court
nominations.67 Political leaders of both parties understand that if they are able to get
a justice on the Court who disagrees with prior jurisprudence, precedent will not be
upheld.68 Weakening the doctrine of stare decisis by relitigating the merits of
important precedent undermines the Court’s image as an apolitical body.
Second, the Janus opinion significantly weakens the importance of one of the
traditional factors of the stare decisis analysis—reliance interests. Most jurists agree

61.

Citizens United, 558 U.S at 362–63 (citation omitted).

62. Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448.
63. Id. at 2460.
64. Id. at 2560.
65.

Id.

66. See Andrew Chung, Conservative U.S. Justices Draw Criticism by Overruling Precedent Again, Reuters

(June 21, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-precedent/conservative-u-s-justicesdraw-criticism-by-overruling-precedent-again-idUSKCN1TM27G (stating that stare decisis “protects
the court’s credibility by avoiding politization” and discussing the then-recent Supreme Court decisions
in which the Court’s conservative majority failed to adhere to stare decisis, which “rais[ed] alarm bells
among its liberal members.”)

67.

See Daniel Bush & Jessica Yarvin, Is The Hyper-Partisan Supreme Court Confirmation Process ‘The New
Normal’?, PBS NewsHour (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/is-the-hyperpartisan-supreme-court-confirmation-process-the-new-normal.

68. Rick Noack, The U.S. Supreme Court is Highly Politicized. It Doesn’t Have to be That Way., The Wash.

Post (June 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/28/the-u-ssupreme-court-is-highly-politicized-it-doesnt-have-to-be-that-way/?noredirect=on.
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that reliance interests should be weighed by the Court when considering overturning
precedent.69 Even Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Janus acknowledges that:
Our cases identify factors that should be taken into account in deciding
whether to overrule a past decision. Five of these are most important here: the
quality of Abood’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its
consistency with other related decisions, developments since the decision was
handed down, and reliance on the decision.70

However, the opinion goes on to dismiss the reliance interests involved in Janus as
insufficient to support upholding the precedent,71 arguing that the poor reasoning in
Abood countervails any reliance interests involved.72 Moreover, by dismissing the
reliance interests involved in Janus—a case involving significant contract interests
where thousands of contracts had been drafted in reliance of the rule in Abood—
Alito and the Court significantly weaken the importance of reliance interests in
future cases involving contract and property rights.73 Reliance interests have
traditionally been “at their acme” in cases involving property and contract rights.74
Here, even with tremendous contract interest ramifications at stake, the Court
dismisses the importance of reliance interests.75
Most concerning, however, is Justice Alito’s reasoning in dismissing the reliance
interests. Alito reasoned that reliance is lessened because “public-sector unions have
been on notice for years regarding this Court’s misgivings about Abood.”76 Essentially,
Alito claimed that unions should have been “on notice” because the Court had
69. Murrill, supra note 14, at 18–22.
70. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478–79.
71.

Id. at 2484.

72. See id. Justice Alito ignored one of the main tenets of stare decisis as articulated by Justice Brandeis in

his Burnet dissent: “[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
it be settled right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serous concern[.]” Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

73. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2499–2500 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In her dissent, Justice Kagan

stated:

The majority undoes bargains reached all over the country. It prevents the parties from
fulfilling other commitments they have made based on those agreements. It forces the
parties—immediately—to renegotiate once-settled terms and create new tradeoffs. It
does so knowing that many of the parties will have to revise (or redo) multiple contracts
simultaneously. . . . It does so knowing that those renegotiations will occur in an
environment of legal uncertainty, as state governments scramble to enact new labor
legislation. It does so with no real clue of what will happen next—of how its action will
alter public-sector labor relations. It does so even though the government services
affected—policing, firefighting, teaching, transportation, sanitation (and more)—
affect the quality of life of tens of millions of Americans.

Id. (citations omitted).
74.

See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 803, 828 (1991).

75. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
76. Id. at 2484.
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articulated, in two subsequent opinions, that it had misgivings about Abood.77
Therefore, according to Alito, reliance is diminished because any public-sector union
interested in seeking nonmember fees “must have understood that the constitutionality
of such a provision was uncertain.”78 Taking this logic a step further presents an even
more concerning implication. According to Alito, if individuals or entities should
know—or are “on notice”—that precedent has been questioned or is in jeopardy of
being overturned, then they should not rely on the precedent.79 But other justices
believe that “reliance upon a square, unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is
always justifiable reliance, regardless of whether that holding seems (to someone or
another) unusually dubious on the merits.”80 Individuals and entities should be able
to rely on what the law is, not what the law might be.
The Court’s interpretation and application of stare decisis in Janus leaves the
doctrine weakened and lacking the bite necessary to ensure it limits the furtherance
of political agendas in the Court. Without considering the practical effects a change
in the law might have, the Court is free to focus on the reasoning of the precedent
and decide whether it likes the decision in question. If it finds the reasoning to be
poor, then the decision may be overturned without regard to the parties involved or
the impact on society. Any change in the political composition of the Court leaves
all of those seemingly settled principles that society, and other actors, have relied
upon open for reconsideration.81 To combat this potentially tumultuous deconstruction
of our legal system, the doctrine of stare decisis must be strengthened by focusing on
the societal impact a change in the law might have, rather than the reasoning of the
precedent in question.
IV. STRENGTHEN BY RESTRUCTURING WITH A FOCUS ON RELIANCE

The weakening of stare decisis undermines the legitimacy of the Court and calls
into question its apolitical status.82 To counter these problems, the doctrine of stare
decisis needs to be strengthened in two ways. First, the stare decisis analysis must be
restructured. A precedent’s “soundness of reasoning” should not serve as a factor in
the Court’s stare decisis analysis—as it did in Citizens United and Janus—but rather,

77.

Id. The two cases cited by Justice Alito that catalogue the Court’s misgivings are Knox v. Service
Employees and Harris v. Quinn. Id. In Knox, the Court found that compelling nonmembers to pay a
portion of union dues represents something of an anomaly. Knox v. Serv. Emps., 567 U.S. 298, 311
(2012). In Harris, the Court considered the holding in Abood to be an anomaly. Harris v. Quinn, 573
U.S. 616, 626–28 (2014).

78. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485.
79. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 313 (2010).
80. Kozel, supra note 3, at 420 (citations omitted).
81.

See generally Frank H. Esterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L. Rev.
422, 422 (1988) (outlining the interactions between text and precedent throughout U.S. history based
on changes in the Court).

82. See Noack, supra note 68.
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should trigger a stare decisis analysis.83 Eliminating the “soundness of reasoning”
factor from a stare decisis analysis prevents the Court from relitigating the merits of
the precedent in question.84 Professor Fred Schauer85 articulated the problem with
relitigating the merits of precedent:
If precedent is seen as a rule directing a decisionmaker to take prior decisions
into account, then it follows that a pure argument from precedent, unlike an
argument from experience, depends only on the results of those decisions, and
not on the validity of the reasons supporting those results. . . . When the
strength of a current conclusion totally stands or falls on arguments for or
against that conclusion, there is no appeal to precedent, even if the same
conclusion has been reached in the past.86

Arguments contending that precedent was poorly reasoned are simply vehicles which
may be used by justices to overrule certain decisions based on personal disfavor or
political views.87
However, one exception to this proposed analysis must be considered. When it is
certain that precedent is “clearly erroneous,” then the “soundness of reasoning” of the
decision may be a factor in the Court’s stare decisis analysis.88 A decision is “clearly
erroneous” if reasonable justices may agree that the decision was poorly reasoned or
fundamentally incorrect.89 When precedent is “clearly erroneous,” the Court is able
to reconsider the precedent’s reasoning where, the combination of experience and
time serve to illustrate that the previous decision was manifestly incorrect.90
Analyzing precedent through the lens of this exception allows the Court to overturn
decisions that are incongruent with contemporary norms—where failure to overturn
such decisions would result in stunting society’s progress.91 An interpretation of stare

83. Esterbrook, supra note 81, at 418.
84. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Frederick Schauer is the David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of

Virginia. See Panelist, 2019 Leon Jaworski Program, A.B.A. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/public_education/Programs/jaworski-public-programs/2019-jaworski-public-programs/
frederick-schauer. He was the Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at Harvard University
from 1990 to 2008. Id.

86. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 576 (1987).
87.

Id.

88. See Kozel, supra note 3, at 418 (exploring what he calls “the degree-of-wrongness” theory).
89. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984–86 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
90. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605–08 (2015) (overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810

(1972), by declaring that the fundamental constitutional right to marry extends to same-sex couples and
citing contemporary cultural views on the nature of marriage).

91.

Tom Hardy, Has Mighty Casey Struck Out: Societal Reliance and the Supreme Court’s Modern Stare Decisis
Analysis, 34 Hastings Const. L.Q. 591, 615 (2007).
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decisis that contends otherwise would “bring adjudications of this tribunal into the
same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only.” 92
The second way to strengthen the doctrine of stare decisis is to make the reliance
interests and societal impact of changing the law key factors when determining
whether precedent should be overturned.93 The Court’s evisceration of the reliance
interest factor in Janus is troubling given the substantial contract interests involved in
the case—an area of law where the Court would normally defer to precedent to
protect the actors who relied on the then-existing law when negotiating and entering
into contracts.94
Courts should contemplate reliance interests on a spectrum in order to determine
the extent to which they should be relied on. On one end of this spectrum is superprecedent—decisions that will likely never be overturned because they are so
ingrained in society that overturning them might disturb societal and governmental
foundations.95 On the other end of the spectrum is precedent that—through the
passage of time and shifting societal norms—has become patently incompatible with
contemporary society.96 This type of precedent falls into the “clearly erroneous”
category and thus, dovetails nicely with the restructured stare decisis analysis
suggested in this Note. In “clearly erroneous” cases, it is evident that the precedent in
question should no longer be relied upon and thus, may be overturned.97
Cases that fall between these two extremes are more difficult to classify. This
Note does not attempt to do so, and any such determination will likely center around
the Court’s analysis of the specific facts of each case. This Note does suggest that the
92.

See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“I have no assurance . . . that
the opinion announced today may not be shortly repudiated and overruled by justices who deem they
have new light on the subject.”).

93.

See Kozel, supra note 3, at 452.

94. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 (2018); see also, Kozel, supra note 3, at 452 –

55. Kozel identifies four different species of reliance that must be taken into account when considering
stare decisis. Id. Specific reliance encourages actors to behave in a certain manner confident that the law
will remain the law of the land. Id. at 453. Governmental reliance considers the effect on the legislative
and executive branches of the government. Id. at 454. Doctrinal reliance considers the effect on the
other branches of the judiciary and the Supreme Court itself. Id. at 459. Finally, societal reliance
considers the effect of the precedent on societal behavior and norms. Id. at 460.

95. Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 1214. Gerhardt explains that in some of the Supreme Court’s foundational

decisions justly labeled as “super-precedent,” reliance is one of the main reasons for upholding such
precedent. Id. Discussing the Legal Tender Cases—cases that established the constitutionality of paper
currency—Gerhardt notes:

Id.

There has been extraordinary social, political, and economic reliance on this decision in
both the public and private sectors. Indeed, no one—not even scholars who believe the
case was wrongly decided—seriously believes the decision ought to be revisited. The
prospect of the social, political, and economic disaster that would result from its
overruling makes it a permanent fixture in American Constitutional law.

96. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Shifting political and social norms created an

environment where society demanded that the holding from Plessy no longer be relied upon. See id.

97.

Id.
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issue in Janus clearly involved property and contract rights and thus, would
traditionally have been protected by stare decisis from being overruled. Overturning
Abood had a direct impact on the rights of the parties who relied on the law set forth
in the case; therefore, Janus should have been classified as super-precedent as opposed
to a “clearly erroneous” case.98 By minimizing reliance interests in cases such as Janus,
the Court severely undermines the effectiveness of the stare decisis doctrine for cases
that would normally demand extra protection. The Court created dangerous
precedent that paves the way for future incarnations of the Court to similarly
disregard reliance interests in cases that would demand otherwise.
The Court must continue to respect the individuals, groups, and entities that
have come to rely on settled precedent put down by the Court.99 These actors rely on
the law to establish certain courses of behavior and should be confident that the law
will remain settled. The majority opinion in Janus dispenses with reliance interests
because the individuals affected should have known that precedent was likely to be
overturned.100 This reasoning represents a fundamental misunderstanding of stare
decisis.101 Namely, that reliance on good law is always justifiable reliance.102
V. CONCLUSION

The Court is trending in a direction that signals it is no longer an apolitical
body;103 and therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis must be strengthened to reestablish
the legitimacy of the Court. If precedent is routinely overturned and decisions to
overturn are driven—even if only in appearance—by a political agenda, the public’s
faith in the Court will only continue its downward spiral.104 By restructuring the
stare decisis analysis to eliminate the focus on the reasoning of the precedent in
question, the Court will be forced to consider the societal impact a change in law
will have and, most importantly, it will be unable to overturn precedent in a politically
motivated manner. This restructured stare decisis analysis strengthens the doctrine,
allowing it to serve as the appropriate agenda-limiting function necessary to rebuild,
and preserve, the Court as an apolitical arbiter of justice.

98. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
99. See Kozel, supra note 3, at 454.
100. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484.
101. Id.
102. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 409 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part).

103. David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court, The Atlantic

(June 29, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarizationand-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/.

104. See Silver & Kozlowski, supra note 16, at 48.
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